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Abstract 
 
The present work is the first of a two-paper project aiming at bringing a new empirical 
contribution to literature on retirement, with particular focus on Italy. In this paper I carry out an 
analysis of Social Security-provided incentives for early retirement and of the main changes 
brought about by the two major early 90s reforms. For this purpose I use a sample of male 
employees drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey on Wealth and Income of Italian Households 
(SHIW) and I calculate both “static” and “dynamic” SS incentive measures: as for the latter, I 
discriminate between “one year” and “lifetime” measures of the accumulation opportunities of SS 
entitlements and suggest new measures to account for the trade-off comprised in the decision of 
retirement. The analysis documents strong early retirement incentives for Public Sector employees 
and relevant binding eligibility constraints for Private Sector workers. In general prosecution of 
work beyond age 60 has been dramatically discouraged due to the actuarial unfairness of pension 
formula. As for the effects of the SS reforms, it emerges that the early 1990s changes will produce 
a strong cut of benefits in the long run, while for current employees the most important changes 
have been the reduction of benefit indexation, the temporary restrictions and actuarial 
penalizations on seniority retirement. It turns out that especially Public Sector employees and 
younger cohorts undergo the strongest benefit cuts. All in all, to the extent to which such benefit 
cuts have been perceived by individuals, one would expect reforms to have induced anticipated 
exits from labor force among older cohorts. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
he relationship between Social Security (SS from now on) provision and retirement choices has been 
especially studied over the last decades. As documented in Coile and Gruber (2000a), previous 
literature dating from 1970s has concluded that SS changes have a significant, but modest effect on 
retirement dates in the U.S.. On the other hand and more plausibly, more recent studies have questioned such results, 
by bringing evidence of a stronger, crucial role played by SS incentives in explaining workers’ retirement behavior. 
The latter approaches, in particular, have pointed out that retirement is, typically, a decision taken by forward 
looking individuals, who, while maximizing a life-time “revenue” function in an uncertain environment, contrast the 
present SS wealth accumulation opportunities with those at some time in the future. In fact, starting from the work 
by Stock and Wise (1990) on the Option Value of retirement, a number of works have shared this assumption and 
assessed its relevance by both estimating structural forms (like Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) and Rust and Phelan 
(1997)) and reduced forms of retirement decisions by allowing for forward-looking behavior through the 
specification of certain SS measures (see Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992), Samwick (1998), Coile and Gruber 
(2000b) and Chan and Stevens (2001)). As for Italy, studies assessing the determinants of retirement are very recent 
and results are somehow still contradictory
1
 (see next paragraph for a brief review). Besides being a deficiency per 
se, such lack of univocal answers impedes any serious forecast about the effectiveness of past and future reforms in 
improving activity rates. In fact, Italy underwent major reforms in the last decade which have strongly reduced SS 
benefits and changed the life-time pattern of the mentioned incentives. Yet, only few works have investigated the 
implications of these changes on retirement behavior. 
 
The present work is the first of a two-paper project aiming at providing a new contribution to this strand of 
literature. For this purpose I propose some new measures of Social Security incentives for anticipated retirement: the 
T 
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first of them is called the Marginal Cost of Retirement (MCR), which captures the trade-off comprised in the choice 
of delaying retirement by one year. The second is a lifetime extension of the MCR  and is referred to as the Minimum 
Cost Value (MCV). Finally, following the same strategy, I present an extension of the already existing Accruals, 
which I call the Minimum Tax Value (MTV). I also compare these new measures with those adopted in previous 
studies. The paper proceeds as follows: I begin with the institutional features of the Italian SS system prior to and 
after 1990s reforms respectively. Next, after sketching the main findings of previous related literature in Italy, I 
describe the new measures I use for capturing the retirement incentives. In the following sections I describe the data 
used in the analysis and present the main results. Final remarks conclude. 
 
2.  Background 
 
2.1  Institutional features of Social Security in Italy prior to and after the 90s reforms 
 
Before 1990s reforms the Italian SS scheme was a mandatory, Pay-As-You-Go system providing two types 
of defined benefit pensions: the “old age pensions” and “seniority pensions”; the former could be claimed 
conditional on the achievement both of age 60 and at least 15 years of SS tax payment. To the latter were entitled 
individuals who, no matter how old, had completed at least 35 years of contribution payment, or 20 years if working 
in the Public Sector. Eligibility rules were even more favorable to women and relatively different (but generous as 
well) for self-employed. The National Fund also provided a means-tested income maintenance scheme for 
individuals over 65 not covered by old-age insurance (minimum benefit scheme), and, among other non contributory 
provisions, survivor benefits and disability pensions. The system was (and still is) financed by both employers and 
employees contributions, with an overall payroll tax of about 26% of gross earnings up to 1992. Employees also 
contributed a further 7.41% to a “severance pay fund” called TFR, managed by the firm and yielding a legislated 
rate of return (1.5% plus ¾ of yearly inflation rate). Retirement at the “normal age” (age 60) was not mandatory, in 
that a worker could postpone retirement up to age 65 in order to complete (no more than) 40 years of contributions. 
As for benefit computation, the formula was given by the product of three elements: the “interest yield”, the number 
of contribution years paid to the Fund and the “pensionable wage” (see Table 4 for the explanation of such 
parameters): for Private Sector employees no more than 80% of pensionable wages were attainable at the moment of 
retirement, while, due to more generous rules, State employees could a more than 90% replacement ratio upon 
retirement. Finally, pensions were indexed according to the nominal wages growth rate. As a consequence, the 
system typically provided more than actuarially fair pensions, since the latter were independent of the amount of 
contributions paid while working. Moreover the almost continuous changes operated by the Parliaments towards 
increasing generosity have led to the crisis of early 90’s and to the corrections introduced by the 1993, 1995 and 
subsequent reforms. 
 
In short, these reforms have tightened eligibility requirements, reduced the SS wealth (especially thanks to 
the indexation of benefits according to a price index), increased the payroll taxes up to about 33% for employees, 
moved the system towards a “contribution-defined” mechanism and initiated an harmonization process of the rules 
among the several National Funds (for example, caps for pensionable earnings and differentiation of the internal 
yield according to wage brackets were introduced also for Public Sector employees, SS payroll taxes for self-
employed were progressively increased in order to reduce the gap with other categories): these measures, as it has 
been claimed by some authors
2
, should be able to stabilize, although only in the long-run, the ratio of pensions 
expenditure to GDP. In fact, the way the reforms have been phased in, so that the actuarially fair computation 
mechanism and some minor changes do not even apply to some category of workers (according to seniority criteria), 
slackens the positive effects on the State unbalances so much that Italy will face SS deficits in the next decades and 
experience a hump of SS expenditure-to-GDP ratio by the early 30’s of the current century3. For these reasons calls 
for new corrections SS rules of such distortions are made systematically. 
 
3.  The SS incentive measures 
 
I now turn to the presentation of the SS incentive measures used in the analysis, starting from the one 
referred to as the Marginal Cost of Retirement (MCR). Let us image an individual is assessing the possibility of 
leaving her job and, thus, retiring in the current year, the latter being also the first period in which eligibility is 
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achieved. I assume that decisions (and wage or pension benefits) occur at the beginning of each year; the agent can 
decide whether working or not for one year more, but the amount of time on the job is given and normalized to 1. 
Thus, by leaving in current year t, the agent gives up her current wage (net of pension payroll tax) and obtains a flow 
of pension benefits up to year D, which is usually referred to as “SS wealth”4. Formally: 
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where tLW ,1  is the wage of year t after L+1 years of work,   is the contribution tax rate, 1, itLP  is the annual 
pension amount corresponding to the minimum number of contributions (L) needed for eligibility, r is the interest 
rate, supposed constant for simplicity. On the other hand, In case she keeps on working another year, she “gains” the 
flow of benefits: 
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By subtracting expression [2] from [1] we get the Marginal Cost of Retiring in year t, which is: 
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More generally, in each future year t+j, one has: 
 
 
   
  
 












1
1 1
1
1,,1
,1,1/
11
1
jtD
i
jtD
i
i
ijtjL
i
ijtjL
jtjLjtjLjL
r
P
r
P
WMCR                 [4] 
 
with j=0,1…  LL  , where L  is the maximum number of working years fixed by the law. Finally, by dividing 
expression [3'] by the current wage, we get the Rescaled MCR. Intuitively, should the benefit formula be actuarially 
fair (or pensions not provided at all), the cost of retiring would be the current wage, thus reproducing a well known 
result stemming from microeconomic theory on labor supply. In all other cases, being the cost either bigger or lower 
than the wage, a distortion of work/leisure choice and, consequently, welfare losses would be brought about
5
. Notice 
that the RMCR is quite close to the to the implicit tax/subsidy of postponing retirement used, among others, by 
Brugiavini (1999) and by Coile and Gruber (2000a), which I indicate as jtjLjLB  ,1/ ; it is defined as the ratio 
between the expected present value of future pension benefits accrual (with negative sign), obtained from 
postponing retirement by one year, and the current period wage. Formally: 
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where   is the intertemporal discount factor; now, supposing   and r equal to 1 and 0 respectively, for the sake of 
simplicity, the following relationship holds:   .1,1/,1/   jtjLjLjtjLjL BRMCR  Consequently, if the 
system is actuarially fair, so that jtjLjtjLjL WMCR   ,1,1/ , (or RMCR=1) then  jtjLjLB ,1/ . On the 
contrary, there is an incentive to early retirement if and only if 
 
  jtjLjLjtjLjLjtjLjtjLjL BRMCRWMCR ,1/,1/,1,1/ 1 .               [6] 
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From the relationships above it can be said that the third inequality to hold, rather than the positive sign of 
B (that is a positive accrual) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of early retirement incentives
6
. 
In this sense, the (R)MCR seems more coherent with the microeconomic theory on labor supply and gives an 
immediate and exact measure of the incentive to early retirement. 
 
A straightforward extension of such parameter is what I call the Minimum Cost Value (MCV) of retirement, 
that is the difference between the minimum marginal cost of postponing retirement in the future and the current date 
marginal cost. Formally: 
 
 tjtt MCRMCRMCV  min  with j=1…  LL  .                   [7] 
 
In other words, this parameter allows for possibility that individuals: i) face a longer time-horizon than a 
single year time-span; ii) compare not just the difference between flows of benefits (like in the Peak Value case) or 
values (like in the Option Value) but the “marginal costs”: in particular, in case the marginal cost reduces as at some 
older age, so that MCVt<0, it is more convenient for individuals to postpone retirement. Again, were the SS system 
actuarially fair, (so that the MCR in each period would equal the current salary) the decision to retire would be 
completely led by the difference between future and present wages. Henceforth, in order to disentangle the effect of 
wage changes from the SS variation, I will also use a rescaled measure of the MCV, that is the difference between 
the minimum expected future RMCR and the current one: 
 
  tjtt RMCRRMCRRMCV  min  with j=1…  LL  .                        [8] 
 
Analogously, one can extend the same reasoning to the Accruals, and build-up the following measure, 
which I call the Minimum Tax Value (MTV); I define such measure as the difference between the Maximum 
expected value of the Accruals (with reversed sign, which can be interpreted as the minimum tax levied upon the 
decision of anticipating retirement by one year) and the value (with reversed sign as well) associated to the current 
year. By calling the negative of the Accrual as the Absolute Tax (ATAX), one gets: 
 
   tjtt ATAXATAXMTV  min  with j=1…  LL  .                      [9] 
 
Again, both (R)MCV and MTV measures indicate that the higher the difference between future and current 
costs (taxes) comprised in the decision of retirement, the more likely individuals will tend to postpone the year of 
retirement. Finally, I will compare the above parameters with the existing Peak Value proposed by Coile and Gruber 
(2000a), defined as the difference between the Maximum future expected SS Wealth and the current one, and the 
Option Value of delayed retirement by Stock and Wise (1990)
7
. 
 
Finally, the replacement Ratio (RR) is defined as the ratio of the first pension to the last wage and can be 
considered a “short-sight” indicator; however one must bear in mind that the interpretation above is a simplification, 
in that the RR represents also the desired standard of living for the future and, thus, it probably comes out of some 
optimization process of smoothing consumption over time. In the remainder of the work I will refer to SSW and to 
RR as “static incentives” and to the others as “dynamic incentives”. Among the latter, I will discriminate between 
“one-year dynamic” and “lifetime” measures, including the (R)MCR, Accrual, Tax/Subsidy in the former subset and 
the Peak Value (PV), (R)MCV, the OV and the MTV in the latter. 
 
4.  Data and empirical strategy 
 
The Data comes from the Survey on Italian Households’ Income and Wealth, carried out by the Bank of 
Italy every two years. It involves about 8000 households, representative of Italian population, and since 1989 a 
partially rotating panel (consisting of about 1/3 of the whole sample) is provided as well, with increasing numerical 
dimension through years. At the moment 5 waves (from 1989 up to 1998) are publicly available. In this study I 
select male individuals who were employed householders (or head’s partners) belonging to the panel component, 
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being both interviewed in two or more waves through 1995 and aged from 48 to 64: notice that the choice of age 64 
is due to the fact that retirement at age 65 was compulsory. Moreover, by exploiting some retrospective information 
(about retirement, family composition) I can built up a sample of person-year observations which includes also years 
not covered directly by interviews (see Spataro (2002) for a detailed explanation of sample building-up strategy). 
 
The sample is constructed conditional on being at work or having retired in the year. I exclude self-
employed individuals since they have been subject to substantially different SS rules, individuals who were still 
working after a previous retirement and those retired prior to being eligible, that is due to special laws, often used in 
Italy for income assistance in favor of older workers at risk of unemployment (“pre-pensionamenti”). As a result the 
original 1065 panel workers and 2129 original person-year data are converted into 4283 person-year observations by 
creating new records for each period not covered but adjacent to the interview year. 
 
 The estimation strategy is particularly complex, in that, first of all, wages reported in the Survey are net of 
taxes, while the formula of pension benefits requires pre-taxes wages; secondly, we need both retrospective and 
future wages: the former are necessary for computing the “pensionable earnings”; the latter are needed to calculate 
forward-looking SS incentives. Finally, contributions paid to the National Fund are provided only in 1995 SHIW 
interviews, while the opportunity cost of retirees (i.e. the current year wage) has to be completely imputed. In order 
to overcome these problems I gross up wages by using information about tax rates and releases due to family 
composition; Then, I impute both wages (past and future) and contributions to my sample after OLS estimations 
over the whole 1989-1995 and 1995 cross sections, respectively. I also correct the composition effect for wages by 
using Heckman’s two-steps procedure: in other words, wages are “purged” from the “selectivity bias” by 
conditioning the wage equation on the probability of being at work; for contributions estimates such correction was 
not necessary since the latter distortion did not turn out to be significant under different specifications of the 
selection equation and both using maximum likelihood or two-steps estimators
8
. 
 
5.  Results 
 
Results are presented separately for Public and Private Sector median workers and according to whether the 
period considered is prior to reforms or not and to whether they are static or dynamic. Introductorily, let us firstly 
look at Table 2a: the first row of the second column contains the SSW provided by the SS system in case the 
individual retires on his 48
th
 birthday. Similarly, as for the “dynamic incentives”, the RMCR column represents the 
yearly cost faced by an individual contrasting the possibility of leaving the labor force at the age labeled in the first 
row or at one year later. All values are expressed in 1992 thousand Italian lira. 
 
5.1  SS incentives prior to reforms 
 
For Public Sector employees, the first relevant finding is that eligibility constraints are binding for only 
21% of the sample (see Total Observations in Table 2a), so that both quantitative and qualitative differences 
between eligible and not eligible workers’ incentives turn out to be negligible: for this reason I will mainly 
comment results stemming from the whole sample of State workers and will discuss those of eligible workers only 
when significantly different. 
 
Starting from the static incentives, the SSW keeps substantially constant through age 53, then declines 
through age 60: this means that in this age interval the increase in the pension level due to the postponement of 
retirement by one year is offset by the “time effect”, that is by the reduction of the time-span in which such accrued 
wealth can be consumed. Notice that, as for eligible workers, the drop in the SSW value by age 60 is less dramatic 
and that SSW rises again only after age 61: clearly this feature is due to the effect of binding eligibility constraints. 
The overall median RR provided by SS in years 1988-1992 is about 67% of the last wage and is upward sloped 
only through age 56 (57 for eligible workers): this feature may be caused by the fact that individuals are different 
along time (some of them enter the panel, other exit for some reason) and by a cohort effect (or selectivity bias), so 
that most individuals who are still at work by their 60s are likely to have completed less payment years to the SS 
National Fund and, thus, would obtain lower pension benefits; in any case, the negative values of the Accruals do 
appear consistent with the SSW age pattern. 
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Turning to the other “dynamic one-year measures”, I will focus on the features of RMCR, in order to 
illuminate its properties both on intuitive and coherence-with-economic-theory grounds. The first worth noting 
result is the fact that the RMCR is significantly less then one throughout the age interval under investigation: this 
means that for an individual aged, say, 54, the actual loss comprised in the choice of retirement at the beginning of 
the year instead of postponing it by one year, would be about 35% of the current wage (less than 18% for the median 
eligible worker aged 54). This finding (together with the high positive value of the implicit tax/subsidy rate) 
confirms the presence of a high “tax” (around 70% of the current wage for the median worker) over continued work. 
However, the steadily decreasing pattern of the RMCR also seems to indicate the possible presence of a (weak) 
dynamic incentive to postpone retirement, since it becomes less costly to delay the exit from work as the median 
individual ages. Another interesting finding is the negative sign of the RMCR starting from age 59, for both eligible 
and the whole Public Sector employee sample: this means that the median worker aged 59 was provided with a 
subsidy for retirement 1,03 times as high as his current year wage. The reasons for the negative sign are possibly 
threefold: the already mentioned actuarial unfairness of the benefit formula, the decrease in wages by the end of the 
age interval, which progressively reduces the pension increase and, finally, the 40 year-contribution limit for 
pension computation. 
 
Looking at the “lifetime” measures of SS incentives, reported in the first four columns of Table 3, results 
do not seem to change significantly
9
: in fact I get negative, substantially decreasing PVs, reaching the minimum 
values by age 60. However, on can infer additional information by looking at the other measures: although with the 
same negative trend and the age 48 maximum/age 61 minimum, the OV keeps positive till age 58 and has two other 
peaks at age 52-53; in turn, and maybe more interestingly, the shape of the RMCV distribution reveals the presence 
of some relative incentive to retirement at ages 51-54 age (as confirmed by the spikes occurring at these ages, which 
however take on negative values). This SS measure reaches the maximum at age 61, when the difference between 
future and present MCR is about -0.12. Yet, notice that negative sign of the RMCV for median workers of all ages 
(and even for those older than 60) confirms that the longitudinal shape of the MCR is downward sloped, at least for 
some future age interval. This finding is supported also by the corresponding lifetime incentive of the (negative of 
the) Accruals, the MTV: in fact it documents that the difference between the minimum of the expected tax levied on 
anticipated retirement and the current year value is negative throughout the whole age interval, meaning that for the 
median individual there is at least one year in the future in which such “tax” on retirement is lower than the present 
one. In the light of the findings above I can conclude that both static and dynamic incentive measures reveal a 
strong discouragement of continued work, which, however, might have been mitigated by the offsetting effect of 
negative RMCVs and MTVs. 
 
As for Private Sector employees, statistics reported in Table 2b show that eligibility rules have played a 
relevant role in determining the shape of SS incentives. In fact, I document a strong non-linearity in the SS 
incentives pattern due to binding eligibility constraints, since the majority of workers younger than 60 are 
constrained on contribution-requirement grounds, so that only 17% of them turn out to be eligible for claiming 
pension benefits (21% out of overall Private Sector employees). Clearly this feature is responsible for the relevant 
non-monotonicity of the SS incentive shapes occurring by age 59. This also can explain why the median RR is zero 
for all median workers aged less than 60 and why the SSW keeps constant throughout the same age interval and 
equal to the discounted present value of the sum of the minimum benefit flow attainable after age 65. (Notice that 
median Accruals are positive due to the indexation of the such “minimum benefits”). Finally, also the RMCR keeps 
constant through age 59 and approximately equal to the fraction of the current wage available after SS tax payment. 
According to this scenario, it clearly emerges that SS matters in retirement decisions, at least for eligibility reasons; 
in any case, after age 60, where eligibility requirement are mostly non-binding, the decision to postpone the exit 
from labor force by one year becomes very costly: in fact beyond that age the RMCR comprised in the choice of 
retiring by the current year instead of by the next is very high. 
 
As for eligible workers, it is worth noting that RR values are, in general, lower than those provided to 
Public Sector employees: this is due to the relatively less favorable rules for pension computation; moreover, the 
non-linearities in the SS incentives (for example, the positive value of the Accrual at age 51), are plausibly to be 
imputed to a composition affect, in that individuals who are eligible at very young ages (and in the first years of the 
sample) contribute to the increase of the median (say, RRs) values until they retire and/or exit the panel. 
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The “lifetime” incentives labeled in Table 3 confirm the role played by the combination of the contribution 
requirement/normal age eligibility rules: in fact, by focusing on the whole Private Sector sub-sample we can observe 
that both the PV and the OV strongly decrease, even changing the sign, at the 60
th
 birthday of the median worker. In 
any case, as for eligible individuals, while the PV is always negative (with the exception of individuals aged 49-51 
and although slightly increasing through age 58), the positive OV values document the existence of incentives to 
postpone retirement up to age 60. The same positive reward of postponing retirement in future years is confirmed by 
the negative sign of the RMCV and of the MTV measures: notice that the range of variation of the latter parameters is 
higher and that their time pattern unveils non-linearities at age 51, 59 and 63 (also 54 and 62 for the MTV)
10
. 
Concluding, also (eligible) Private Sector employees turn out to have been provided with generous, incentives for 
early retirement, although mitigated by the effect shown by some of the lifetime measures. 
 
5.2  SS incentives after reforms 
 
In Table 5 the variation rates of SS incentive measures are reported for period 1993-1995. For the sake of 
comparability I focus on those individuals who were eligible both before and after reforms. In fact the major 
restriction has been the temporary halt to early retirement (that is retirement with less than 35 year of contribution 
payment) imposed by the Government in years 1993 and 1995: as a consequence, the number of Public Sector 
individuals entitled with a State pension almost halved. According to the computations the SSW level of eligible 
workers has decreased dramatically due to such reforms: by about 20% and 18.5% for Public and Private Sector 
employees respectively; the main cut has been the reduction of the benefit indexation started in 1993. In fact both 
1993 and 1995 reforms were phased in only gradually, so that the cut of benefits was designed to affect younger 
cohorts in the first place (see Table 4 for a summary of the most relevant changes): this is the main explanation of 
the heavier reduction of SSW undergone by younger cohorts. Accruals lowered by 15-16% and very similar was the 
reduction of the Peak Value. Results appear less straightforward when one looks at the changes of other dynamic 
parameters. On the one hand, although the median RMCR fell down for both eligible Public and Private Sector 
employees, the magnitude of such changes are quite different: a 45% reduction for the former and only 4.4% for the 
latter, respectively. Moreover, as for the RMCV, the signs of the overall variation diverge, even though the range of 
its changes is small (-3.2% an 3.8% respectively). On the other hand, the MTV measures decreased by about 15% 
for both categories. A possible explanation of these differences might by the following: both categories experienced 
major reductions of SS benefits, so that the future cost of retirement has increased, but Public Sector employees 
underwent the strongest cuts (due to the relatively higher impact of changes on the pensionable earnings formula, 
the introduction of wage caps and, perhaps more importantly, the penalization on early retirement by means of 
actuarial adjustment of pension levels introduced in the transitional phase). Consequently, for State employees it 
resulted economically convenient to delay the choice of retirement by some years after reforms. In other words, the 
median worker employed in the Public Sector could compensate the reduction of his pension entitlements by 
prosecuting his activity. On the contrary, for the other working category, the reforms, although lowering the level of 
the static incentives (such as SSW) had little impact on the dynamic incentives (both one year and lifetime), whose 
main source of variation has probably been the rise of SS payroll taxes. 
 
Finally, significant non-monotonicities in the pattern of SS incentives changes are worth noting: this 
feature, again, can be explained by recalling that reforms in the transitional phase where conceived to produce 
effects inversely correlated with seniority (for example, a few pension cuts did not apply to individuals who had 
completed 40 years of payment to the National Fund); in fact this explanation seems to be coherent also with the 
high non-linearities in the changes of both the RMCR and the RMVC shown by the State eligible workers: to put it 
differently, given the less restrictive eligibility requirements enjoyed by latter employees, it is plausible that their 
higher heterogeneity in the years of contribution payments is mostly responsible for the higher variability that the 
effects of the reforms show for this working sector. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the present work I compute the SS incentives to early retirement enjoyed by Italian male employees 
during the late 80s and early 90s. The contribution I propose is twofold: firstly, I use the 1989-1995 panel provided 
by bank of Italy Survey (SHIW), thus complementing the previous works which either have been merely theoretical 
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(i.e. based on simulations of representative workers) or used different data sources (such as the National Fund 
(INPS) archive, which however covers Private Sector employees only). Secondly, I set up three new measures of 
“dynamic incentives”: the first is called the Marginal Cost of Retirement (MCR) and, although very close to already 
existing parameters, clarifies the economic nature of the cost comprised in the choice of anticipating retirement by 
one year. Moreover, it has the property of providing an exact and intuitive measure of the tax/subsidy on prosecuted 
work brought about by the actuarial unfairness of the pension formula; finally, the rescaled version of the MCR 
allows for strongly reducing the correlation of this parameter with the current wage. The second new measure is the 
Minimum Cost Value (MCV), which is a lifetime extension of the MCR: precisely, it is the difference between the 
minimum expected MCR in any future year and the current MCR. Finally, by the same reasoning, a “lifetime” 
version of the (negative of the) Accruals is proposed (referred to as the Minimum Tax Value, (MTV)). 
 
Results show that, first of all, it is necessary to discriminate between Public and Private Sector, since 
eligibility rules, benefit computation formula (more favorable for the latter) and reform impacts have been 
substantially different for these categories of workers. Secondly, I do find evidence of strong incentives for early 
retirement for Public Sector employees before reforms. In fact for such workers the SSW was substantially 
decreasing with respect to age; moreover, the one-year dynamic incentives confirm the relevant “tax” levied on the 
prosecution to work provided by SS system prior to reforms: in fact the median RMCR was abundantly less than 1 
(about 29% of current salary) and decreasing for almost all ages. As for the Private Sector workers, computations 
show that the contribution requirement for retirement eligibility has been binding for the majority of Private Sector 
workers; this notwithstanding, it comes out that also such workers enjoyed strong (one-year dynamic) incentives to 
retire once the normal age (age 60) had been reached. However, some of the lifetime dynamic measures (particularly 
the negative values of both RMCV and MTV for both Sectors) reveal the presence of incentives for postponing 
retirement which may have been contrasting (or even offsetting) the impact of the former. 
 
Finally, early 1990s reforms reduced the median SSW by about 20% and the median Peak Value by almost 
19%; however, among eligible workers, Public Sector employees appear to have borne most of the burden of the 
benefit cuts, particularly due to the higher penalizations on early retirement. There also comes out that younger 
cohorts have been and will be more dramatically in the future the net-payers for the rebalance of the Italian SS 
system. In fact, both the generous pre-reform benefits and the reduction of the RMCV and MTVs occurred in the 
transition phase of reforms has provided the older cohorts with a substantial incentives for exiting the labor force. 
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Table 1: Sample for the analysis 
Year Number of Observations 
 Original Observations Person-year Observations 
 Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector 
88   162 162 
89 158 157 158 157 
90   333 335 
91 334 345 334 345 
92   321 328 
93 321 325 321 325 
94   273 240 
95 262 227 262 227 
Total 1075 1054 2164 2119 
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Tab 2a: Static and one-year dynamic SS incentives: 
Medians by age (Public Sector employees, years 1988-1992). Std. Dev. in parentheses 
  Whole sample  Eligible workers 
Age  Obs SSW* Accrual* SS Tax   RMCR RR  Obs SSW* Accrual* SS Tax RMCR RR 
               
48 
 
96 
570276.2  
(252360.5) 
-2191.9 
(95347.5) 
.063 
 (2.30) 
.697 
(2.29) 
.574 
(.27) 
 
72 
603744.5 
(220983.2) 
-8502.9 
(45948.1) 
.216 
(1.17) 
.549 
(1.13) 
.615 
(.07) 
49 
 
106 
584969.4  
(217099.8) 
-1207.5 
(44840.8) 
.037 
 (1.36) 
.714 
(1.34) 
.572 
(.28) 
 
78 
580024.2 
(184934.6) 
-2982.78 
(16719.9) 
.091 
(.85) 
.668 
(.81) 
.623 
(.07) 
50 
 
116 
581885.8 
(196524.7) 
-7016.2 
(11902.7) 
.248 
 (.42) 
.510 
(.40) 
.621 
(.30) 
 
83 
599081.2 
(189291.1) 
-5909.2 
(13646.3) 
.244 
(.48) 
.517 
(.46) 
.668 
(.08) 
51 
 
106 
577468.7  
(249805.8) 
-10048.8 
(23271.8) 
.322 
 (.50) 
.438 
(.48) 
.635 
(.28) 
 
84 
603286 
(228201.3) 
-10831.5 
(25219.9) 
.356 
(.53) 
.408 
(.51) 
.672 
(.07) 
52 
 
107 
547934.6  
(227425.9) 
-9267.0 
(34315.1) 
.317 
 (1.07) 
.444 
(1.05) 
.650 
(.27) 
 
87 
541168.8 
(215917.7) 
-9065.8 
(31308.4) 
.303 
(.79) 
.454 
(.76) 
.666 
(.07) 
53 
 
92 
562312.8    
(271981) 
-14119.4 
(36964.6) 
.398  
(1.13) 
.363 
(1.12) 
.685 
(.29) 
 
73 
570825.9 
(237971.2) 
-14237.4 
(28036.2) 
.407 
(.70) 
.356 
(.67) 
.713 
(.08) 
54 
 
97 
558205.1  
(240992.2) 
-13879.6 
(47484.1) 
.424  
(1.54) 
.346 
(1.53) 
.676 
(.32) 
 
71 
564407.8 
(228303) 
-17681.6 
(32346.6) 
.615 
(.66) 
.177 
(.63) 
.710 
(.09) 
55 
 
99 
528356.8  
(234199.1) 
-11638.3 
(45392.1) 
.430 
 (1.12) 
.327 
(1.08) 
.701 
(.27) 
 
84 
530286.4 
(233303.5) 
-10602.9 
(47515.7) 
.397 
(1.02) 
.359 
(.98) 
.714 
(.09) 
56 
 
97 
534873.6  
(237526.3) 
-14593.5 
(22654.4) 
.499 
 (.55) 
.263 
(.53) 
.721 
(.30) 
 
78 
528577.5 
(220125.1) 
-14363.8 
(24837.3) 
.498 
(.60) 
.263 
(.58) 
.735 
(.09) 
57 
 
87 
490100.3  
(257528.1) 
-14849.0 
(27565.6) 
.507 
 (.99) 
.250 
(.98) 
.713 
(.31) 
 
69 
509579.7 
(241148.6) 
-17059.5 
(21866.4) 
.546 
(.73) 
.223 
(.70) 
.750 
(.09) 
58 
 
67 
493828.6  
(232980.5) 
-21512.3 
(19806.2) 
.623 
 (.55) 
.152 
(.53) 
.684 
(.27) 
 
57 
485862.6 
(222464.4) 
-20099.2 
(19427.8) 
.602 
(.54) 
.166 
(.51) 
.720 
(.08) 
59 
 
60 
458684.1  
(200150.9) 
-26381.1 
(16648.6) 
.806  
(.65) 
-.034 
(.64) 
.693 
(.26) 
 
51 
460892.3 
(194222.6) 
-26740.5 
(11868.9) 
.846 
(.34) 
-.062 
(.33) 
.702 
(.08) 
60 
 
55 
394232.9  
(182656.4) 
-28078.6 
(29994.7) 
1.001 
 (.78) 
-.211 
(.74) 
.657 
(.34) 
 
37 
433376.5 
(166357.7) 
-26526.2 
(33604.6) 
.930 
(.86) 
-.153 
(.81) 
.706 
(.09) 
61 
 
39 
401932.3  
(243315.3) 
-32116.7 
(48778.4) 
1.120 
 (.98) 
-.322 
(.94) 
.712 
(.24) 
 
35 
414990.4 
(243573.8) 
-37891.9 
(50865.6) 
1.136 
(1.01) 
-.350 
(.96) 
.722 
(.09) 
62 
 
36 
446296.5  
(239200.4) 
-27195.3 
(36361.1) 
1.073 
 (.74) 
-.278 
(.71) 
.711 
(.31) 
 
29 
438466.3 
(241856.1) 
-34649.2 
(36289.5) 
1.132 
(.65) 
-.345 
(.62) 
.735 
(.10) 
63 
 
28 
413200.4  
(278127.8) 
-29326.2 
(58893.3) 
.922 
 (2.23) 
-.148 
(2.12) 
.775 
(.11) 
 
28 
413200.4 
(278127.8) 
-29326.2 
(58893.3) 
.922 
(2.23) 
-.148 
(2.12) 
.775 
(.11) 
64 
 
20 
318238.7  
(219946.2) 
-33958.3 
(102743.8) 
1.266 
 (2.52) 
-.447 
(2.38) 
.754 
(.11) 
 
20 
318238.7 
(219946.2) 
-33958.3 
(102743.8) 
1.266 
(2.52) 
-.447 
(2.38)  
.754 
(.11) 
Total 
 
1308 
531166.9  
(241353.6) 
-12352.09 
(45010.91) 
.425 
 (1.24) 
  .340  
(1.21) 
.667 
(.29) 
 
1036 
534376.9 
(229628.6) 
-13810.3 
(35660.8) 
.473 
(.94) 
.296 
(.90) 
.696 
(.09) 
 (1992 lira divided by 10000) 
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Tab 2b: Static and one-year dynamic SS incentives: Medians by age (Private Sector employees, years 1988-1992). Std. Dev. in parentheses 
Age    Whole sample      Eligible workers   
  Obs SSW* Accrual* Tax-rate RMCR RR  Obs SSW* Accrual* Tax-rate RMCR RR 
               
48  139 86996.02 1266.656 -.0446391 .7981508 0  19 542558.1 -22494.69 .7282349 .0456405 .6983364 
   (171135.2) (76374.18) (2.812407) (2.814776) (.2333639)   (135756.2) (17537.67) (.7252873) (.7050376) (.0730111) 
49  135 87345.76 1310.188 -.0470995 .806577 0  8 456371.8 1000.547 -.0337448 .7955966 .5881642 
   (119821.9) (131845.3) (4.010884) (4.009946) (.1447157)   (152172.5) (7137.909) (.3954777) (.3855417) (.0569607) 
50  136 87735.66 1316.031 -.0525749 .8178064 0  15 485976 1656.688 -.0551416 .8101421 .5593443 
   (157867.9) (92578.14) (3.179289) (3.179928) (.1792241)   (130272.6) (6306.435) (.19893) (.2010753) (.0196567) 
51  139 88163.6 1283.648 -.0539044 .8233103 0  17 497570.5 8741.063 -.299233 1.061564 .5839171 
   (169259.4) (123320.3) (4.04594) (4.050728) (.2001675)   (125775.2) (20640.46) (.7562145) (.7430784) (.0513467) 
52  122 88634.59 1329.516 -.0545503 .8206824 0  16 420091.4 -11838.05 .431399 .3286857 .6097656 
   (126752.1) (151273.8) (4.346708) (4.347949) (.2153458)   (72648.73) (22948.24) (.9721853) (.9477434) (.0700263) 
53  119 91848.48 1298.07 -.0449811 .8067044 0  24 435131.4 -16728.13 .5546509 .2147889 .6146461 
   (188911.7) (100933.3) (3.971569) (3.945018) (.2530632)   (159313.2) (92305.46) (5.00594) (4.90123) (.0526817) 
54  97 89732.9 1306.508 -.0543026 .8144756 0  26 417554 -19949.73 .676736 .092269 .665283 
   (175507.6) (135409) (4.11977) (4.117726) (.2965014)   (115125) (18596.33) (.6938871) (.6795089) (.0521722) 
55  97 93119.59 1277.422 -.0482433 .8068368 0  29 388391.8 -14990.88 .5919914 .1761159 .6325566 
   (180287.2) (57620.54) (2.14081) (2.139388) (.2959351)   (126115.6) (14392.56) (.5073074) (.4909848) (.0607103) 
56  86 91136.15 1326.938 -.0580499 .8266801 0  21 383533.5 -13427.56 .5610456 .2045872 .6361234 
   (170182.9) (93440.32) (3.25955) (3.257451) (.2831346)   (96428.95) (19221.13) (.7038714) (.6880518) (.0606946) 
57  78 91987.29 1339.328 -.0602063 .8264536 0  19 356612.8 -10457.28 .443062 .3289677 .6524584 
   (143433.5) (113132.8) (2.779883) (2.776902) (.2897086)   (101992.7) (18691.48) (.8703077) (.8480099) (.0692422) 
58  53 92947.69 1353.313 -.0611605 .8400452 0  10 330580.4 -6944.969 .3126885 .4562565 .6124615 
   (153826.5) (76512.11) (2.078593) (2.078382) (.2497657)   (205971.8) (7519.468) (.1675417) (.1649171) (.0494384) 
59  40 91268.76 122024.2 -6.122542 6.867431 0  4 334956.8 -8241.938 .3421519 .4352995 .6133626 
   (103995.3) (123640.9) (2.977769) (2.979212) (.1941376)   (144169) (18780.86) (.8183873) (.8032988) (.0617695) 
60  42 242354.3 -13227.75 .6292872 .1545493 .4995357  32 243639 -12827.59 .61906 .169289 .5521789 
   (121579.9) (27232.45) (1.35556) (1.318282) (.2524005)   (131381.7) (28619.55) (1.36615) (1.321742) (.1169275) 
61  22 258609.3 -14288.86 .721157 .0667611 .6099141  18 289713.9 -17782.77 .812004 -.022537 .6410121 
   (198438.3) (40814.82) (1.088869) (1.04933) (.2801915)   (205773.6) (44789.1) (1.190979) (1.146449) (.1385294) 
62  10 351069.2 -27619.75 .8421918 -.0541895 .647954  8 359734.2 -31059.02 .9293686 -.1401263 .6576388 
   (172654.3) (29043.77) (.8781459) (.85023) (.2907268)   (182561.5) (31770.1) (.971219) (.9391488) (.1237059) 
63  9 196219 -10054.09 .5490527 .2465746 .5741457  9 196219 -10054.09 .5490527 .2465746 .5741457 
   (225673.7) (59636.26) (6.162938) (6.045916) (.1847222)   (225673.7) (59636.26) (6.162938) (6.045916) (.1847222) 
64  3 161003.3 -25537.47 1.466859 -.6679646 .6523787  3 161003.3 -25537.47 1.466859 -.6679646 .6523787 
   (104928.5) (17519.18) (.5948706) (.4490144) (.2216944)   (104928.5) (17519.18) (.5948706) (.4490144) (.2216944) 
Total  1327 89288.54 1304.938 -.0498938 .8142855 0  278 405327.3 -12355.3 .5263702 .2427403 .6208985 
   (163987) (110193.4) (3.577429) (3.573245) (.2572404)   (163834.9) (37396.78) (2.125417) (2.080865) (.0957386) 
* (1992 lira divided by 10000) 
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Tab 3: Lifetime SS incentives, Medians by Sector and age (years 1988-1992). Std. Dev. in parentheses 
Age  Public Sector  Private Sector  Private Sector (Eligible) 
  PV* OV* RMCV MTV  PV* OV* RMCV MTV  PV* OV RMCV MTV 
                
48  10839.72 98168.22 -2.127117 -12332.61  303551.2 489431.5 -1.360727 -282994.8  -22494.69 6660.563 -.8502559 -22494.69 
  (144753.3) (224879.5) (2.55139) (153925.7)  (213176.6) (348296.8) (3.799934) (233372.5)  (23076.12) (62189.13) (.951555) (14559.68) 
49  1580.281 77505.09 -2.603156 -6458.828  320409.5 501501.9 -2.39854 -264910.3  4067.469 50479.22 -1.933819 -4008.047 
  (100460.4) (163742.1) (1.777035) (109693.7)  (198215.2) (317079.5) (4.836712) (288181.5)  (13443.61) (51053.84) (1.114621) (4740.183) 
50  -5150.125 53552.78 -2.390772 -9874.391  253913.5 423887.8 -2.439919 -227458.9  11740.94 83140.88 -2.575255 -8017.5 
  (92669.72) (162185) (1.409794) (96246.58)  (195502) (299889.7) (3.877915) (245143.4)  (4806.337) (27342.55) (.8806281) (10616.28) 
51  -9471.625 67997.84 -.593918 -11993.41  252167.2 416825.8 -.9674044 -203426.1  9399.875 64626.81 -2.885279 7592.625 
  (74313.34) (190834.8) (1.150193) (75750.17)  (201429.9) (323963.1) (4.639748) (266241.1)  (21429.94) (40144.98) (1.259563) (20487.5) 
52  -7653.25 102987.6 -.4862249 -12042.25  235505.2 395099.6 -.9198551 -167882.5  -11621.42 45333.84 -.2972168 -12054.67 
  (84188.11) (188074.6) (1.32521) (83719.35)  (185809.1) (309978.2) (5.421961) (259452.6)  (25172.23) (62540.21) (.8097276) (22027.08) 
53  -9401.734 94802.38 -.4159189 -22187.28  168156.8 340834.5 -.6838517 -154548.8  -15799.25 34097.86 -.3932401 -17173.05 
  (112533.9) (232509.9) (1.716636) (96277.28)  (207139.4) (339550.2) (3.908437) (230806.3)  (24367.92) (95304.53) (4.560858) (165427.7) 
54  -6103.375 51037.13 -.593887 -17681.69  144530.5 287027.1 -.8125622 -66544.32  -19949.73 5905.234 -.3622962 -25573.47 
  (82316.11) (175483.1) (1.661865) (77467.82)  (188279.3) (299689.5) (4.256293) (225786.1)  (22114.31) (77753.34) (.7575284) (18489.49) 
55  -7647.375 46293.03 -1.219239 -16765.25  124846.9 254020.6 -.8438491 -80752.74  -14990.88 27532.38 -.5169994 -18501.56 
  (65743.17) (151653.7) (1.793177) (76253.22)  (172221.7) (278776.5) (2.30452) (175833.2)  (32659.75) (93445.63) (.8049237) (15123.71) 
56  -13417.13 11403 -1.466683 -18626.38  126834.3 228535.3 -.9225606 -67322.15  -13427.56 23992.81 -.542997 -13773.16 
  (42877.49) (72978.96) (1.825435) (67301.48)  (137909.6) (200896.6) (3.526936) (168971.2)  (39553.87) (102965.6) (.8026623) (18942.49) 
57  -13072.38 13360.19 -.8716284 -20156.63  113828.6 204700.7 -.9917951 -85924.63  -6893.422 18223.81 -.704767 -11546.28 
  (37408.19) (70650.3) (2.119869) (69981.4)  (142443) (198098.3) (3.362172) (163090.8)  (19501.32) (51987.34) (.5864549) (18545.49) 
58  -21375.94 1232.063 -.8130783 -29792.22  110039.9 179715.3 -1.121289 -104272.6  -6510.383 32595.75 -1.04723 -10240.16 
  (32350.61) (50360.84) (1.758538) (56330.64)  (125985) (170564.9) (2.161738) (142385.9)  (8911.465) (22834.81) (.2901567) (7275.996) 
59  -25344.5 -2320.031 -.6922038 -28899.77  122024.2 178529.7 -7.193488 122024.2  -8241.938 10079.8 -1.184129 -8241.938 
  (25454.91) (41874.53) (1.02025) (30477.82)  (123640.9) (162822.2) (2.946799) (123640.9)  (18780.86) (30086.32) (1.025367) (18780.86) 
60  -26526.28 -10149.78 -.2780949 -28625.44  -13227.75 3037.203 -.496588 -13227.75  -12827.59 6018.344 -.6046442 -12827.59 
  (43105.99) (75791.67) (1.188546) (28485.07)  (48797.44) (94240.16) (1.211376) (18979.98)  (53684.67) (104228.2) (1.229069) (18457.2) 
61  -31044.63 -15990.91 -.1288565 -32116.78  -14288.86 -488.3984 -.285364 -14288.86  -17782.77 -4525.063 -.276896 -17782.77 
  (58668.54) (81977.28) (.8622808) (74462.24)  (46317.13) (76875.72) (.6111267) (37484.19)  (51117.43) (85273.17) (.6441632) (40858.28) 
62  -26067.97 -13784.95 -.1884129 -27195.36  -27619.75 -7337.563 -.2184145 -27619.75  -31059.02 -11066.22 -.2610065 -31059.02 
  (58145.6) (76717.31) (1.567384) (69461.15)  (30526.36) (40643.13) (.5640732) (28009.41)  (33619.33) (45626.41) (.6366335) (30454.83) 
63  -26373.25 -9497.523 -1.292689 -29326.28  -10054.09 2003.938 -.8844218 -10054.09  -10054.09 2003.938 -.8844218 -10054.09 
  (125122.8) (162897.8) (1.633382) (76027.55)  (59632.56) (64181.09) (5.83038) (59646.91)  (59632.56) (64181.09) (5.83038) (59646.91) 
64  -33958.32 -20409.8 -.3528753 -33958.32  -25537.47 -20266.39 .0944008 -25537.47  -25537.47 -20266.39 .0944008 -25537.47 
  (116676.8) (147015) (2.112281) (94756.93)  (17519.18) (13379.33) (.3433084) (17519.18)  (17519.18) (13379.33) (.3433084) (17519.18) 
Total  -10028.78 38808.27 -.7292454 -18485.98  174795 327970.7 -1.048387 -134422.3  -12297.47 20507.7 -.6505887 -13227.75 
  (86290.75) (166695.1) (1.766782) (86841.1)  (200071.6) (322432.6) 4.096514 (238175.4)  (34863.94) (78899.61) (2.098419) (54713.38) 
* (1992 lira divided by 10000) 
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Table 4: Major features of the SS system prior to and after 1990s reforms* 
Years  Seniority Pensions  Old age Pensions  
SS 
payroll 
tax 
Pensions 
Indexation 
Rate 
Pension formula 
Yearly interest 
rate (nominal) 
Time span for 
“Pensionable 
earnings”  
computation 
(average of wages of 
the last: 
 
 
Age Contributions  
Normal 
Age 
Contributions       
1988-1992 
 
- 
 35 years 
(20)  no more 
than 40 
 60 15  26.4 
Wage 
growth 
Defined Benefits 
2% and decreasing 
according to wage 
caps (more than 
2% and no caps) 
5 years 
(approximately 1 
year) 
1993 
(Amato 
Reform: 
transition) 
 
- 
 35 and no 
more than 40 
 60 16 
 27.17 
Price 
growth 
2% (decreasing 
according to wage 
caps and earning 
brackets)+1% 
yearly indexation 
of wages entering 
the pensionable 
earnings for the 
part of pension 
maturated from 
1993 to retirement 
date  
Same as prior to 
reform+50% period 
from 1/1/93 to 
retirement date 
1993 reform 
regime 
 
  65 20 Whole working life 
1994 
 
- 
35 (between 21 
and 35), and no 
more than 40 
 61 16 
Same as 93 +50% of 
time between 1/1/93 
and 31/1/96+66.6% of 
time from 1/2/96 to 
retirement date 
1995 
(Dini Reform: 
transition) 
 
- 
 35 and less 
than 40 
 62 17  
32.7 
Defined Benefits 
(+Defined 
Contribution 
Correction for 
younger workers) 
1995 reform 
Regime 
 
Seniority Pensions 
Disappear 
 Either  57 to 65 age and at 
least 35 years of 
contributions 
or 40 years of 
contributions and any age 
  Defined Contribution 
Long run GDP 
growth rate 
Whole working life 
* Public Sector in parentheses, if different from Private Sector. If not specified changes in the transitional phase apply to workers who had paid 
contributions for at least 15 years by 1/1/1993. 
* Since 1994 a penalization on retirement before 35 years of contributions was introduced: about 1.5% of pension benefit decrease for each 
contribution payment year missing to 35. 
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Table 5: Variation rates of SS incentives (with respect to pre-1993 reform values): medians (years 1993-95, eligible workers) 
Age  Public Sector  Private Sector 
  Obs SSW* Accrual* RMCR PV* OV* RMCV MTV  Obs SSW* Accrual* RMCR PV* OV* RMCV MTV 
                   
48  27 -.365975 .363114 .654430 .4827827 -.0488921 .2495057 -.2847711  6 -.231925 .5774409 .613168 .5774409 -4.161929 .4390195 .311342 
49  24 -.317399 .435577 .716645 .297922 -1.409981 .0470935 .284247  16 -.203781 -.3572607 .509000 -.3572607 .4142129 .4609412 .399090 
50  22 -.345088 .794376 .968854 .7444188 1.172522 -.0064713 .625347  12 -.199188 -.2668325 .039166 -.3515521 7.536994 -.0603352 -.266832 
51  23 -.292079 -.206359 .28296 -.2063594 .3624161 -.1794049 -.2063594  20 -.194595 -.1920994 -.065942 -.1925076 -.0606705 .2717675 -.190219 
52  29 -.241866 .680724 1.49319 .242385 -.0316331 .026193 .242385  29 -.190005 -.1834596 -.057211 -.1834596 -.0620399 .1821364 -.18258 
53  25 -.219 -.157247 .231592 -.1880448 2.161469 -.1171264 -.1821777  24 -.185422 -.1703583 -.060237 -.1703583 -.6688835 .1172593 -.169063 
54  25 -.217307 -.360173 -.23394 -.3685321 -1.237383 -.2473392 -.3601733  22 -.180847 -.1682545 -.055575 -.1682545 .3540232 -.2763237 -.16084 
55  27 -.188688 -.336760 -.60753 -.3569005 -.3434569 -.4717673 -.258079  26 -.176283 -.1513721 -.053428 -.168487 -.1729802 -.2449695 -.124581 
56  28 -.184012 -.178832 .222642 -.1788324 .3542378 .0251402 -.0767522  18 -.171732 -.0903572 .229301 -.1180138 .536287 .1080429 -.110438 
57  18 -.180696 -.169259 .592111 -.1821547 -.1003917 .1145131 -.1691965  17 -.178800 -.1677022 .141895 -.1794966 -.0737624 -.0051497 -.118074 
58  34 -.175329 .393031 2.05138 .3930319 4.598944 -.2663664 .3281096  15 -.162672 -.1517393 -.034772 -.1438016 .2887193 -.2638882 -.174517 
59  27 -.170796 -.730958 -1.2306 -.2780257 -.8337328 .1348159 -.1888919  11 -.170277 -.1325952 -.072114 -.1324699 -1.157753 -.3252686 -.132469 
60  29 -.153680 -.159947 2.20065 -.1606108 .1204561 -.0270803 -.1606075  15 -.165800 -.1408412 -.035563 -.1303312 -.1225671 -.0706914 -.140841 
61  27 -.161788 .577651 1.116 .2699801 1.246237 -.4812537 .2699801  7 -.180761 -.1811029 2.44957 -.1811029 .4182815 -.020722 -.181102 
62  24 -.166984 -1.04449 -.93236 -1.044491 -1.051757 1.279261 -1.045837  5 -.144773 -.2261251 .064845 -.2261251 .0682891 -.0382527 -.226125 
63  18 -.150341 .419885 1.51492 .5110015 .6510411 -3.913524 .2075815  5 -.228748 -.1883238 .754318 -.1883238 .2042271 -.1697878 -.188323 
64  7 -.135966 -.147679 1.01926 -.1476795 .0253316 2.684359 -.1476795  3 -.135966 -.1625848 .068965 -.1625848 .022799 -.0923983 -.162584 
Total  414 -.199188 -.153560 .453773 -.1604561 .0072168 -.0320772 -.1568635  251 -.185198 -.1697106 -.043947 -.170434 -.0439842 .0385665 -.159780 
* (1992 lira divided by 10000) 
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Endnotes 
 
1
  The main contributions are from Brugiavini (1999), Blondal and Scarpetta (1998), Miniaci (1998), Spataro 
(2000) Brugiavini and Peracchi (2001) and Colombino. See Spataro (2002) for a review of the results. 
2
  Precisely, Bosi (1995 and 1997) has shown that this will be true, at the steady state, if the GDP growth rate 
will at least equal the discount rate used in the pension formula (i.e. 1.5%). For critical reviews of recent 
Italian reforms see Castellino (1995), Gronchi (1995), Onofri (1998) and Vitaletti (2000). For the main 
macroeconomic features of the reforms see Bosi (1995 and 1997), while the works by Ferraresi and 
Fornero (2000) shed light on short run and long-run early retirement incentives, respectively. 
3
  Besides the excessive length of the transition phase, which will maintain significant early retirement 
incentives and wealth windfall gains for the baby boomers cohorts, the other major criticisms concern the 
regime phase: the lack of economic growth indexation of benefits, the excessive level of the contribution 
rates, which would impede the possibility of a real diversification; the difference between the actual and the 
computation payroll-tax and, finally, the permanence of several National Funds and differences in the 
pension rules among sectors. 
4
  For the sake of simplicity I abstract from survivor benefits and survival probabilities. The latter are 
however accounted for in the estimations of all parameters presented in the section Finally, I assume that 
individuals start paying contributions at the beginning of their working careers. 
5
  The analysis of SS systems optimality was presented in the seminal work by Aaron (1966); the 
reconsideration of such conditions under endogeneity assumption of labor supply is provided by Hu 
(1979) and Breyer and Straub (1993). For a macroeconomic, static analysis of the links between 
employment and social security see also Casarosa (1996).  
6
           This is property does not hold in case the subjective discount rate (  ) is different from the interest rate. A 
deeper discussion of this case is more complex and beyond the scope of the present work; however, as an 
example, it can be shown that in a funded system and for reasonable values of the wage growth rate and 
the interest rate, the MCR will be greater than (lower or equal to) the current wage if and only if  r . 
(The formal demonstration of this proposition is available upon request to the author). 
7
  For the sake of comparability with previous estimates carried out by Brugiavini and Peracchi (2001), I 
assume an intertemporal discount rate factor   of 0.985, the marginal utility of leisure (k) equal to 1.25, a 
risk aversion parameter (a) equal to unity and r equal to 3%, survival probabilities are taken from tables 
provided by ISTAT for the years considered, while future pensions (before reforms) are indexed by 1.5% 
per year. I have also computed all incentives with different specifications of parameters (comprising also 
the case in which  r 11 , which however do not change the qualitative pattern of the incentives and 
conclusions. 
8
  See Greene (1999) for Heckman’s correction model. The exact regression specifications and results for 
contributions and wages are available under request to the author. 
9
  As anticipated, I show the results for the whole Public Sector sub sample since differences with eligible 
individuals are in this case negligible. 
10
  Although the small dimension of such subset suggests caution in drawing general conclusions from 
statistical inference, the similarity with the Public Sector values of both RMCR and MTV parameters 
seems a robust result. 
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